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Abstract 
 
Equipped with the advantages of flexible access control and fine-grained authentication, 
attribute based signcryption is diffusely designed for security preservation in many scenarios. 
However, realizing efficient key evolution and reducing the calculation costs are two 
challenges which should be given full consideration in attribute based cryptosystem. In this 
paper, we present a key-policy attribute based signcryption scheme (KP-ABSC) with 
delegated computation and efficient key updating. In our scheme, an access structure is 
embedded into user’s private key, while ciphertexts corresponds a target attribute set. Only 
the two are matched can a user decrypt and verify the ciphertexts. When the access 
privileges have to be altered or key exposure happens, the system will evolve into the next 
time slice to preserve the forward security. What’s more, data receivers can delegate most of 
the de-signcryption task to data server, which can reduce the calculation on client’s side. By 
performance analysis, our scheme is shown to be secure and more efficient, which makes it a 
promising method for data protection in data outsourcing systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Attribute based encryption (ABE) was initially proposed in [1]. Since then, many novel 
literatures constructed on ABE were presented [3-5]. In ABE, the concept of “access policy” 
is introduced, only the user’s attributes suit with the policy can he complete decryption [7-8] 
[20]. A file owner may set a data centric access policy without concerning about the specific 
identity of each user in the system (note that the amount of user in the system may be very 
large). Consequently, ABE is a more effective tool for data protection in large data 
outsourcing platforms [2]. Later, attribute based signature (ABS) was put forward. Equipped 
with capability of achieving flexible authentication, ABS also becomes a resultful 
mechanism for providing data verification between users in different application scenarios. 
Inspired by the notion signcryption [9], researchers successfully combined the merits of 
ABE and ABS and proposed several attribute based signcryption (ABSC) schemes [10-12] 
which provide both functions of ABE and ABS in a single step. Compared with the 
traditional sign-then-encrypt method, their schemes are shown to be outperformed with 
respect to efficiency.  
However, there still exist some shortages in existing ABSC schemes. To begin with, the 
schemes proposed in [10-12] centered on the protection of data, but neglecting the protection 
of keys. In other words, they haven’t taken backward and forward security into full 
consideration when user’s privilege alternation or key leakage occurs. Image that when 
attribute revocation or key leakage occurs, the system will face threaten since the private key 
haven’t been securely refreshed. Thus an efficient and effective key evolution mechanism 
[18][21] is urgently to be proposed.  
Furthermore, the existing works related to ABSC consumes considerable computation 
overheads, which may add difficulty to users during data sharing. Since attribute based 
cryptosystem is extremely suitable for providing safeguard in data outsourcing systems, the 
computation task can also be delegated to the data server, which will minimizes the 
computation cost on the client side. 
To provide a better method of data sharing in outsourcing systems, in this paper, the 
following constructions are established: 
1) We proposed an attribute based signcryption with key exposure protection and 
delegated calculation for data outsourcing systems. In our scheme, the ciphertexts are labeled 
by a set of attributes while a user’s private key accords with a structure. Only the two are 
matched can a user decrypt and verify the ciphertexts.  
2) The ciphertexts generated by signer corresponds a certain time slice in the system. 
When key leakage happens, the system will evolve into the next time slice to preserve the 
forward security. The public parameters needn’t to be changed during the evolution of user’s 
private key, which minimizes the overheads brought by parameter synchronization. 
3) During the process of data sharing, data receivers can delegate most of the 
de-signcryption task to data server, which can decrease the calculation burden on client side. 
4) Via proof and efficiency analysis, our scheme is show to be confidential and 
unforgeable, which makes it a promising method for data protection in data outsourcing 
systems. 
The rest of paper is arranged as follows: 
Section 2 reviews the existing state of art related to our research. Section 3 gives the 
syntax and security models of our scheme. Section 4 contains a full description of the 
proposed KP-ABSC along with the correctness proof. Section 5 focuses on the security proof 
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and efficiency evaluation. Section 6 provide a real world application scenario of our scheme. 
Finally, the conclusion is made in Section 7. 
 
2. Related works  
2.1 Attribute based Signcryption 
Signcryption [9] can provide the merits of encryption and signature in a single phase. 
Meanwhile, the computation cost of signcryption is less than the traditional 
Encrypt-after-Sign method. With the advent of signcryption, many schemes based on this 
notion have been put forward. The proposed schemes are mainly constructed upon public 
key cryptography or identity-based cryptography, but much fewer with regard to attribute 
based cryptography. Actually, the notion of signcryption can also be introduced to attribute 
based cryptography to propose signcryption schemes which combine the encryption function 
of ABE and signature function of ABS. Hong et al. in [10] take the advantages of liner secret 
sharing mechanism and proposed an attribute based signcryption, which provides high 
decryption and authentication. Their scheme can be used for security preservation in 
date-centric scenarios. Wang et al. in [11] proposed a CP-ABSC scheme which combines 
ABE and ABS in one logic step, and the computation cost is much less than the traditional 
ABS+ABE method. In [12], Hu et al. proposed a fuzzy ABSC and achieves significant 
results in BAN system. Their scheme is a novel mechanism which realizes an appropriate 
balance between security and scalability. The above schemes have realized effciecnt 
protection of data, but neglecting the protection of keys[22-25]. In other words, they haven’t 
taken backward and forward security into full consideration when user’s privilege alternation 
or key leakage occurs. In ABSC, both privilige revocation and key leakage call for the 
demand of secure key evuolution[26], thus it’s high time to introduce a fkxeible key 
refreshing mechanism in ABSC.  
2.2 Proxy decryption 
Proxy decryption is an effective method which can decrease the computation burden on 
user’s client side. By delegation, the data server will undertake most of the decryption task. 
More importantly, the data are still confidential to the semi-trusteed data server, thus the 
user’s privacy can be guaranteed. Many researchers have presented attribute based proxy 
decryption schemes in data outsourcing systems [6] [13-17]. Green et.al in [6] firstly 
proposed the ABE with proxy calculation. In their scheme, the private key of a user consists 
of two components: one is the kept private by the user himself while the other is used for 
proxy decryption. During the process of data sharing, user firstly sends the key for proxy 
decryption to data server. Data server decrypts the initial ciphertexts using the proxy key and 
sends the transformed ciphertexts back to user. Then user can finish the decryption and 
recover the plaintext at a very low cost. Lai et.al presented a verifiable ABE with delegated 
decryption in [13]. Their scheme provides flexible management over the ciphertext stored in 
the cloud and the computation cost is sharply decreased. Their scheme also allows a user to 
verify whether the ciphertexts from data server are correctly transformed. Qin et.al in [14] 
presented a framework for outsourcing system along with the concrete algorithms. The 
proposed scheme helps relieve the computation burden both on the cloud data server and 
user clients. Aim to tackle authentication related issues in outsourcing systems, Liu et.al 
proposed an ABS for cloud computing in [15]. By delegation, user’s computation overheads 
are much more reduced during signing and verification. Similarly, schemes in [16-17] also 
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take the merits of outsourcing data server and achieve significant results. From what has 
been discussed above, it can be figured out that proxy computation can reduce the 
calculation cost on client side sharply, which in turn help users gain an enhanced experience 
during data sharing. 
3. Models and assumptions 
3.1 Models 
The data sharing process of the proposed KP-ABSC is illustrated in Fig. 1. At the 
beginning, data signer signcrypts the plaintexts using the possessing private key and the 
target attribute set. In this way the plaintext is well encrypted and can be verified. Then he 
outsources the ciphertexts to data server. When a data receiver wants to get access to the 
ciphertexts, he firstly sends a request containing the proxy key to data server. Data server 
delegates most of the de-signcryption work in advance and returns the transformed 
ciphertexts to receiver. After that, receiver can recover the plaintext from the transformed 
ciphertext at a very low cost. 
 
Plaintext
Private key of 
the signer
Attribute set
Attribute 
authority
Private key of 
the receiver
Data server
Transformed 
Ciphertexts
Plaintext
Data uploader 
side
Data receiver 
side
Key distribution 
&evolution
Key distribution 
&evolution
Data outsource
Access request 
&Proxy key
Proxy
De-signcryption
Signcrypt
Signcrypt
De-signcrypt
De-signcrypt
 Fig. 1. Process of KP-ABSC 
3.2 Syntax 
Our scheme consist of the following algorithms: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: It takes a security parameter as input and outputs the system master keys and 
public parameters. 
𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒: It takes the system master keys and an access structure as input, outputs 
the private key of a user at the initial time slice. 
𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟ℎ: It takes the system master keys and the information of time slices as input, 
outputs the key refresh components for the current time slice. Users update their temporal 
private keys by making calculations on these components. 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: It takes a plaintext, public parameters and the temporal private keys a data 
owner processes as input, outputs a ciphertext. 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: It takes the ciphertext and the temporal private keys a data receiver 
processes as input, outputs a valid plaintext or a reject symbol. 
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3.3 Security definitions 
Since we present an attribute based signcryption which provides both the encryption and 
authentication, we will prove its confidentiality and unforgeability.  
Definition1: The confidentiality of our scheme can be proved by the following security 
game.     𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆:     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾  claims 𝑆𝑆 to be challenge attribute set. Simulator  generates the system 
parameters.     𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾:     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾  can obtain temporal private key for an access structure 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞 by making 
temporal private key generation queries to simulator.     𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆:     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 picks plaintexts 𝑀𝑀0  and 𝑀𝑀1 . Simulator picks  𝜃𝜃 ∈ {0,1}  and outputs 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆{𝑀𝑀𝜃𝜃,𝑆𝑆} as the ciphertext.      𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 outputs a value 𝜃𝜃∗ to be the guess of 𝜃𝜃. If 𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝜃𝜃 then 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 wins 
the game. 
Denote 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴) = �𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒[ 𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝜃𝜃] − 1
2
� to be the advantage in the challenge game.  
Definition2: The unforgeability of our scheme can be proved by the following security 
game:     𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆:      𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 claims an an access structure 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐  to be challenge structure. 
Simulator generates the system parameters.     𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾:     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 chooses an access structure 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞 (containing attribute set 𝑆𝑆) and a plaintext 𝑀𝑀. 
Simulator outputs 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆{𝑀𝑀, 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞} as the ciphertext.  
Note that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 cannot ask for the 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 of 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐.     𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆:     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 computes a ciphertext. Simulator verifies the ciphertext by running  𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 − 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 algorithm.     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 wins if the ciphertext can be verified correctly. 
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3.4 Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman hardness assumption (DBDH): 
For 𝑒𝑒, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞∗, given (𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 ,𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 ,𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 , 𝑧𝑧), it is computational infeasible to distinguish 
( 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵 = 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 ,𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 ) and ( 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵 = 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 ,𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑧𝑧 ) within 
probabilistic polynomial-time. 
4. Constructions 
The concrete constructions of our KP-ABSC are described as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: Let 𝐺𝐺1  and 𝐺𝐺2 be two cyclic groups with prime order 𝑆𝑆.Denote g is the generator 
of 𝐺𝐺1 .Let ?̂?𝑆 ∶ 𝐺𝐺1 × 𝐺𝐺1 → 𝐺𝐺2  be a bilinear pairing. Define three functions:  𝑟𝑟1: {0,1}∗ →
𝐺𝐺1,𝑟𝑟2: {0,1}∗ → 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗ ,𝑟𝑟3: {0,1}∗ → {0,1}𝑚𝑚. AA randomly chooses 𝑎𝑎,𝐾𝐾 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  with 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  for 
each attribute in the system and computes 𝑌𝑌 = ?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑦𝑦,𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙 ,𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 . The 
system master keys are {𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ,𝐾𝐾, 𝑎𝑎}, while the system public parameters can be denoted by {𝐺𝐺1,𝐺𝐺2,𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆, ?̂?𝑆,𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌, 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝑟𝑟1,𝑟𝑟2,𝑟𝑟3}.  
𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒: AA picks a unique secret number 𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  for each user in the system. 
Without loss of generality, at time period 𝑆𝑆0,for a signer with attribute structure 𝛾𝛾, its initial 
private key is denoted by 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡0 = {𝐷𝐷1,𝐷𝐷2,𝐷𝐷3} = �𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆0)𝑙𝑙,𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 ,𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆0)𝑙𝑙, 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝛾𝛾�.  
𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟ℎ: In order to update user’s private key from time slice 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 to 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚+1, AA 
calculates the updated key component 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚+1  for each attribute 𝑒𝑒 as �𝑓𝑓1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚+1)𝑓𝑓1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚) �𝑙𝑙and sends 
the key refreshing component to users. Upon receiving the updating information, users 
update their temporal private keys by computing 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚+1 = �𝐷𝐷1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚+1 ,𝐷𝐷2,𝐷𝐷3 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚+1�.  
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: To separate the roles of signer and receiver, we denote 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 to be the attributes 
owned by signer 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 to be that of receiver. The signer picks 𝑒𝑒,𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  and calculates: 
𝐶𝐶0 = 𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑥𝑥 
𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 
𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑥𝑥 
𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷3𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀,𝑘𝑘) 
𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑥 
𝐶𝐶5 = 𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝑀𝑀                                 (1) 
Then signer sends {𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶5} to data server. 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: The process of 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 consists of two steps:  First step: The receiver sends an access request and outsources 𝐷𝐷1 to data server. Data 
server calculates: 
𝑚𝑚 = � ?̂?𝑆(𝐷𝐷1,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖)
?̂?𝑆(𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾  
𝐴𝐴 = ∏ ?̂?𝑆�𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�                                                       𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾             (2) 
Data server sends 𝑚𝑚, 𝐴𝐴 back to receiver. 
Second step:  
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The receiver calculates 
 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑟𝑟3( 𝐶𝐶0𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷2)⊕𝐶𝐶5                           (3) 
And verifies: 
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷2 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐻𝐻2(𝑀𝑀∗) ∏ ?̂?𝑆 �𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗+𝑘𝑘)�𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾                            (4) 
If lemma (4) holds, then the signature is valid and it outputs 𝑀𝑀∗ as the correct plaintext. 
Correctness proof: 
The correctness of delegating de-signcryption made by data server is proved by lemma 
(5): 
𝑚𝑚 = �?̂?𝑆( 𝐷𝐷1,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖)
?̂?𝑆(𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖,𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾                                                                        = �?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑙𝑙 ,𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥)
?̂?𝑆(𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑥𝑥 ,𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾                                          = �?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑙𝑙 ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥)
?̂?𝑆(𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑥𝑥,𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾                                        = �?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥) ∙ ?̂?𝑆( 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑙𝑙 ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥)
?̂?𝑆(𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑥𝑥,𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾                       = �?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥)
𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾
                                                              
 = �?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾
                                                                 
= ?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢                                                                          (5) 
The correctness of de-signcryption made by receiver is proved by lemma (6) (7): 
 
𝑘𝑘 = 𝐶𝐶0
𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷2
= 𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑥𝑥
𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
 = 𝑘𝑘 ∙ ?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑥𝑥
?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∙𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢                                                                      = 𝑘𝑘                                                                                     
 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝐶𝐶5 = 𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝑀𝑀 = 𝑀𝑀                                 (6) 
 
𝐴𝐴 = �?̂?𝑆�𝐷𝐷3𝑥𝑥+𝐻𝐻2(𝑀𝑀∗),𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾
                                                                                 
= �?̂?𝑆�(𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙)𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾
                                           
= �?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘) ∙ ?̂?𝑆( 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙 ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘)
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾
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= �?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)∙(𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘)) ∙ ?̂?𝑆( 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�,𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘)
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾
                  
= ?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑦𝑦∙(𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘)) ∙�?̂?𝑆 �𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘),𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾
                      
= ?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑 ∙𝑑𝑑 ∙ ?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑦𝑦∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘) ∙�?̂?𝑆 �𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑥 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘)�
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾
 = 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷2 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘) ∙ ∏ ?̂?𝑆 �𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘)�                𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾 (7) 
5. Performance analysis 
5.1 Confidentiality 
Theorem 1: The proposed KP-ABSC is secure if DBDH hardness assumption holds. 
Proof: If an 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 breaks our KP-ABSC with advantage 𝜀𝜀 in the selective model, 
then a simulator can be constructed to break the DBDH hardness assumption with an 
advantage of  𝜀𝜀 2� . 
The security game is as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: Define cyclic groups of prime order 𝑆𝑆, 𝐺𝐺1  and 𝐺𝐺2 .Denote g  to be a generator 
of 𝐺𝐺1. Let ?̂?𝑆 ∶ 𝐺𝐺1 × 𝐺𝐺1 → 𝐺𝐺2 be a pairing. Define 2 functions:  𝑟𝑟1: {0,1}∗ → 𝐺𝐺1,𝑟𝑟2: {0,1}∗ →
𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝
∗ .  
Picks 𝜃𝜃 ∈ {0,1},𝑒𝑒, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  at random and sets: 
�
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 1 = �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 ,𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 ,𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐�      𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝜃𝜃 = 0
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 2 = �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 ,𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 ,𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑧𝑧�          𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝜃𝜃 = 1 
The goal of 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  is to guess the 𝜃𝜃  according to the response made by 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾. 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 claims an attribute set 𝑆𝑆. 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾:  
Simulator picks 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  for each attribute and sets 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 to be: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏∙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒 ∉ 𝑆𝑆 
When 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 asks for the result of temporal private key of structure 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞, simulator 
responds as follows: 
When 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, sets 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = {𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆0)𝑙𝑙 ,𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 ,𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆0)𝑙𝑙 , 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞}. 
When 𝑒𝑒 ∉ 𝑆𝑆, sets 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = {𝑆𝑆 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏∙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆0)𝑙𝑙 ,𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 ,𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∙𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆0)𝑙𝑙 , 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞}. 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 picks 𝑀𝑀0, 𝑀𝑀1. Simulator randomly picks 𝑒𝑒 → 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  and calculates 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜃𝜃 = {𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑥𝑥 ,𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ,𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑥𝑥 ,𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝑀𝑀𝜃𝜃}                                             (8) 
Let  𝑟𝑟1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚)𝑥𝑥 = 𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 then we have: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜃𝜃 = �𝑘𝑘?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ,𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝑀𝑀0,𝜃𝜃 = 0𝑘𝑘?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆)𝑧𝑧,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ,𝑟𝑟3(𝑘𝑘)⊕𝑀𝑀1,𝜃𝜃 = 1                                                (9) 
When 𝜃𝜃 = 1, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜃𝜃 is a random number. Under this circumstance simulator guesses 𝜃𝜃∗ 
randomly.  
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𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒(𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃 = 1) = 1
2
                                                                    (10) 
When  𝜃𝜃 = 0 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜃𝜃  is a valid ciphertext. Under this circumstance the advantage of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 is 𝜀𝜀. 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒(𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃 = 0) = 1
2
+ 𝜀𝜀                                                             (11) 
Consequently, the overall advantage is: 12𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒(𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃 = 1) + 12𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒(𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃 = 0) − 12 = 12 × 12 + 12 �12 + 𝜀𝜀� − 12 = 𝜀𝜀
2
                                                                                         (12) 
5.2 Unforgeability 
Theorem 2: The proposed KP-ABSC has the unforgeability if CDH hardness assumption 
holds. 
Proof: If an 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 can forge a legal ciphertext with an non-neglectable advantage in 
the chosen message model, then a simulator can be constructed to break the CDH hardness 
assumption. Note that we have proved the confidentiality of KP-ABSC, thus in this proof we 
only focus on the unforgeability. For clearness, the construction of ciphertext is a little 
different, but it will not influence the final result. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: Set the same parameters like Theorem 1.  
Randomly chooses 𝑒𝑒, 𝑏𝑏 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗ . 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾  claims an attribute set 𝑆𝑆. The aim of simulator is to calculate the value of 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 under the condition that the value of 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 and 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 are known. 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾:  
Simulator picks 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  for each attribute and sets 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 to be: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗 ∉ 𝑆𝑆 
When 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾  asks for a 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  query of a plaintext and structure 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞 , 
simulator responds as follows: 
Firstly, simulator calculates the temporal private key of 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞 . 
When 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, sets 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = {𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆0�𝑙𝑙 ,𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 ,𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆0�𝑙𝑙 , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞}. 
When 𝑒𝑒 ∉ 𝑆𝑆, sets 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = {𝑆𝑆 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆0�𝑙𝑙 ,𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 ,𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆0�𝑙𝑙, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞}. 
Then, simulator picks 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  and calculates  
𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖 = (𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆0�𝑙𝑙)𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀∗,𝑘𝑘),𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑥                          (13) 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 outputs a signature for plaintext 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐. 
Simulator outputs as the solution to CDH hardness assumption. 
�𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐)�−1∏ 𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐                                       (14) 
Proof: If the signature is a valid one, then we have: 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 = �𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)�−1 ∏ 𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)                              𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 (15) 
Thus: 
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�?̂?𝑆�𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝑆𝑆�
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐
= ?̂?𝑆( 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 ,𝑆𝑆) ∙ ?̂?𝑆(𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘),𝑆𝑆) ∙� ?̂?𝑆 �𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘),𝑆𝑆�
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐
 
�𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐
= 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘) ∙�𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)
𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐
 
�∏ 𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑟1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)�−1 ∙ ∏ 𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏           (16) 
Thus we have: 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 = �𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)�−1 ∏ 𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶4,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙∙𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙𝑓𝑓2(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘)                              𝑗𝑗∈𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 (17) 
5.3 Efficiency 
This part discusses the efficiency of our KP-ABSC. We mainly analyze the amount of 
pairing and exponentiation (note that these two consumes much more than other operations 
in discrete group [19]) in each algorithm of our KP-ABSC. Denote “𝑒𝑒” to be the number of 
universal attributes, “𝑒𝑒” and “𝑗𝑗”to be the attributes of signer and receivers respectively. The 
results with are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Performance evaluation 
Algorithms Exponentiation Pairing 
Setup 2𝑒𝑒 + 1 1 
Key extraction 2𝑒𝑒 0 
Key update 𝑒𝑒 0 
Signcrypt 2𝑒𝑒 + 2𝑗𝑗 + 1 0 
De-signcrypt(Total) 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑗𝑗 + 2 𝑗𝑗 + 3𝑒𝑒 
De-signcrypt(Client) 𝑒𝑒 + 2 𝑒𝑒 
De-signcrypt(Server) 𝑗𝑗 3𝑗𝑗 
 
We compare our scheme with Guo’s ABSC scheme in [27] and Wei’s in [28]. The 
comparison are conducted in terms of the relative computation in de-signcryption as well as 
the sizes of ciphertexts and private keys. Denote “𝐴𝐴” to be the threshold value and “𝜌𝜌” to be 
the length of a user’s identity in [27]. 
 
Table 2. Performance comparison 
Scheme Access 
structure 
De-signcrypt
ion 
Sizes of private 
keys 
Sizes of 
ciphertexts 
Key 
evolution 
[27] Key policy 𝑂𝑂(|𝜌𝜌| + |𝑗𝑗|) 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒|2 + |𝐴𝐴|2) 𝑂𝑂(|𝜌𝜌| + |𝑗𝑗|) No 
[28] Key policy 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒|) 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒|) 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒| + |𝑗𝑗|) No 
Ours Key policy 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒| + |𝑗𝑗|) 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒|) 𝑂𝑂(|𝑒𝑒| + |𝑗𝑗|) Yes  
It can been seen from Table 2 that the sizes of private keys are smaller in our scheme, 
while the load of de-signcryption and sizes of ciphertexts are in the same order of magnitude. 
However, in our scheme since most of the de-signcryption task has been delegated to the 
data server, thus the computation cost of de-signcrypt algorithm is also lower in our 
KP-ABSC. What’s more, our scheme supports key evolution and the process will not bring 
new system parameters to the system, this will reduce the overheads which parameter 
synchronization brings. 
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Then we conduct the experimental setups of schemes in [27] [28] and our scheme. The 
comparison mainly focus on the de-signcryption time cost on the client side. The 
experiments are conducted on PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) library underlying 
pairing-based cryptosystems. The operating system on the experimental computer is Ubuntu 
12.04 with 6GB RAM. We set the order of elliptic curve group to be 160 bits. The 
comparison results are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison results 
 
From Fig. 2, it can be seen that with the number of attributes increasing in the system, our 
scheme needs much less time cost for de-signcryption, thus our scheme archives better 
efficiency. 
6. Application of KP-ABSC 
A typical application of our scheme is pay TY system, which has gained increasingly 
popularity nowadays. In the scenario, the television programme is encrypted using several 
attributes while user’s privileges are described by an access structure. For instance, if a user 
has paid for becoming a VIP of “Sports” and “Movie”, then his structure can be illustrated as 
Fig. 3. If the TV programme 1 is encrypted by {“Sports”, “VIP”} or TV programme 2 
{“Movie”, “VIP”}, then the user can correctly decrypt these encrypted programme.  
Or
Sports
VIP 
And
Movie
Programme 1:“Sports”, “VIP”
Programme 2:“Movie”, “VIP”
 
Fig. 3. An example of user’s access structure 
 
If the user no longer wants to renew his “Sports” services in the coming time slice, then he 
will not receive the key evolution component of the attribute “Sports”, then his access 
structure will be altered as Fig. 4 shows. If a TV programme is encrypted by {“Movie”, 
“VIP”}, the user can still get access to the programme since he still holds the attribute of 
“Movie”. On the contrary, he can no longer get access to the programme related to “Sports” 
since this attribute has been revoked. 
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Or
Sports
VIP 
And
Movie
Programme 1:“Sports”, “VIP”
Programme 2:“Movie”, “VIP”
 
Fig. 4. An example of user’s access structure after revocation 
 
The advantage of this application is that the programme publishers can set a data centric 
access policy without concerning about the specific identity of each user in the pay TV 
system, thus the encryption is very efficient.   
Our scheme can also be applied to other data outsourcing systems such as database system, 
video-on-demand system, etc.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a KP-ABSC with key exposure protection and delegated 
calculation for data outsourcing systems. Our scheme achieves flexible access management 
along with verification over the encrypted data. During the process of data sharing, data 
receivers can delegate most of the de-signcryption task to data server, which will relieve the 
client devices from heavy calculation. By performance analysis, our scheme is shown to be 
secure and achieves high efficiency at the same time. 
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